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SAFEWA Y STORES v. BARRACK
Respondeat Superior In "Shoplifting" Cases*
Safeway Stores v. Barrack1
Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant foodstore
and one of its employees to recover damages for malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had
made purchases in other stores, and upon entering defen-
dant's store, he placed these bundles in a pushcart along
with various articles he wished to purchase from the de-
fendant. After the plaintiff paid his bill, and while he was
in the act of placing his purchases in a box along with the
bundles he had when he entered the store, a pound of
butter and a small can of pepper fell to the floor. Smith,
an employee of the defendant, who was standing near the
counter, immediately came up to the plaintiff, showed him
a badge, and charged him with trying to avoid payment
by placing the butter and the pepper in the parcels which
he had when he entered the store. The plaintiff denied
Smith's charges, but offered to pay for the items, which
offer Smith refused, whereupon he left the store followed
by Smith. Smith forced the plaintiff to return to the store,
to be taken to a back room where, in the presence of the
store manager, the police were called and plaintiff was
arrested. Smith testified that it was his job to break up
shoplifting; that the retail operations manager had told
him, that he, as retail operations manager, wasn't going to
stop any means of helping to protect the company's prop-
erty; that the plaintiff had been nasty about the whole
affair; and, finally, that the retail operations manager had
told him to use his own discretion if people acted nasty,
and to do what he wanted to with them. The store manager
testified that he did not interfere with the detention of the
plaintiff, since matters of this nature were usually left up
to Smith.
The lower court allowed the case to go to the jury,
which returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $2,500, which
was reduced by remittitur to $1,250. From this verdict the
defendant appealed, contending that the evidence was in-
sufficient to support a finding that Smith was acting within
the scope of his authority in having the plaintiff arrested,
so as to make the defendant store liable for his actions
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The Court of
* To illustrate how serious and extensive the problem of shoplifting is, it
has been conservatively estimated that goods worth over $300,000,000 are
taken from stores by shoplifters annually.
'210 Md. 168, 122 A. 2d 457 (1956).
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Appeals affirmed the judgment, on the ground that the
evidence warranted findings that Smith was employed for
the very purpose of apprehending and prosecuting shop-
lifters and that his actions were in the regular course of
and within the scope of his employment, making the defen-
dant liable. In support of its decision the court cited
McCrory Stores v. Satchell2 and B. C. & A. Ry. Co. v.
Ennalls,8 following the majority rule that, where in false
imprisonment cases, there is conflicting evidence as to the
scope of employment of the agent, it is for the jury to
decide the scope and the extent of the agent's implied
authority in order to determine the principal's liability
under respondeat superior.4
It is interesting to note that, in the development of the
law of principals' responsibility for false imprisonment,
the Court of Appeals in several early cases had accepted
and relied upon the view taken by the New York case of
Mali v. Lord,5 which held that liability for false imprison-
ment by an agent could not be imputed to the principal
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The New York
case reasoned that the principal should not be held, since
an agent could have no implied authority to do an act
which the principal could not justify if he were present
himself. In the McCrory case, relied on in the instant case,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland retreated from its earlier
position, apparently on the theory that all the New York
case decided was that the plaintiff had not introduced evi-
dence as to the agent's scope of authority sufficient to take
the case to the jury. The court also explained the earlier
case of Bernheimer v. Becker,6 on the ground that the
agent in that case was merely an ordinary agent from the
scope of whose employment the authority to cause a false
1 148 Md. 279,129 A. 348 (1925).
s108 Md. 75, 69 A. 638 (1908), where the court held that the determina-
tion of whether an alleged false imprisonment of a suspected thief was
within the general scope of employment of a special officer hired to protect
the property of the Railway Company was for the jury.
,,West v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 215 N. C. 211, 1 S. E. 2d 546 (1939);
Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 223 N. C. 470, 27 S. E. 2d 283
(1943) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Dowling, 43 Ga. App. 549, 159
S. E. 609 (1931); Friedman v. Martin, 43 Ga. App. 677, 160 S. E. 126
(1931) ; Combs v. Kobacker Stores, 114 N. E. 2d 447 (Ohio, 1953) ; Perkins
Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 155 S. W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App., 1913) ; McCrory Stores
v. Satchell, 8upra, n. 2; 1 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §245; 2 MECHEM,
AGENOY (2d ed., 1914) §1982.
539 N. Y. 381 (1868). Maryland cases which cited this case, apparently
adopting its reasoning, are Carter v. Howe Machine Co., 51 Md. 290, 297
(1879) ; Central Railway Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394, 407, 28 A. 615 (1894);
Bernheimer v. Becker, 102 Md. 250, 255, 62 A. 526 (1905).
eIbid.
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imprisonment could not be implied so as to make the prin-
cipal liable.
The McCrory case constituted a virtual repudiation by
Maryland of the rule of the Mali case, yet the court did not
expressly reject the rule, seeking to explain the earlier
decision. The principal case, by relying on McCrory v.
Satchell, finally lays to rest the ghost of Mali v. Lord in
Maryland and brings this state squarely into line with the
majority view, holding that the jury can find the principal
liable for false imprisonment if the agent's authority for
such an act can be implied from the general scope of his
employment. The Mali case, which expresses the minority
view, has been subjected to such severe criticism7 and has
been so drastically limited in later New York cases8 that
it is of questionable vigor today.
The liability of a master for a servant's wrong doing is
founded upon the maxim qui facit per alium, facit per se.9
Such liability, though it may involve various tortious acts
by the servant, is governed by the principles of master-
servant rather than by the principles of tort law, since the
liability is imposed on the one who does not commit the
wrongful act himself. It is evident that no problem arises
where there is express authority granted to the agent to
do the act in question, the principal being clearly liable.
The area in which the questions arise is the more nebulous
one of the extension of liability under the doctrine of im-
plied authority. In ascertaining the agent's implied au-
thority in this particular area, or any area, the character
of the position and the duties incidental to it are important
elements for consideration. ° In studying the character of
the position of agents who have no express authority to
protect the principal's property, the terms "manager" and
See, e.g. Field v. Kane, 99 Ill. App. 1 (1901); Staples v. Schmid, 18
R. I. 224, 26 A. 193, 195-6 (1893) ; J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309,
82 S. W. 2d 359, 362 (1935) ; Knowles v. Bullene & Co., 71 Mo. App. 341
(1897).8 Palmeri v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 133 N. Y. 261, 30 N. E. 1001 (1892);
Dupre v. Childs, 52 App. Div. 306, 65 N. Y. S. 179 (1900). These cases
limit the ruling of the Mali case to mean that the general employment of
a superintendent, who has general management of the business, does not
warrant his causing the arrest of a person suspected of stealing the prin-
cipal's property; 35 A. L. R. 656. However, the Mali decision was held con-
trolling in the later New York case of Homeyer v. Yaverbaum, 197 App.
Div. 184, 188 N. Y. S. 849 (1921), which involved a store manager and a
suspected shoplifter.
922 AM. Jun. 378, False Imprisonment, §35. "He who acts through an-
other acts himself, [i.e., the acts of an agent are the acts of the principal]."
BLACxK's LAW DiCniONAY (4th ed., 1951) 1413.
10 J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, supra, n. 7; MECHEM, Op. Cit., 8supra, n. 4,
§1973; 3 COOLEY, ToRTs (4th ed., 1932) §396.
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"assistant manager" carry an inference that their acts are
the acts of the store, inasmuch as they are entrusted with
the general management and custody of the entire business.
This in turn renders the principal liable when such em-
ployees cause the false imprisonment of a customer with
intention of protecting the principal's property, such actions
being incidental to and consistent with the general scope of
such agents' employment.1' Usually a subordinate agent
cannot cause his principal to become liable for false im-
prisonment since the protection of the principal's property
is not normally entrusted to him nor is it his implied duty,
in the absence of delegation to so protect the property.12
When an agent, regardless of his position, is expressly
delegated the duty of protecting the principal's property,
there arises an implied authority to do everything reason-
able and necessary to protect the property, thus giving rise
to liability on the principal for his acts in performance
of such a duty. 3 In lieu of entrusting such a duty to in-
experienced store employees, professional detectives are
sometimes hired, the advantage being that better protec-
tion is afforded the store, and the possibility of liability for
mistaken arrests is diminished by the experience and judg-
ment of such trained persons.'
It is obvious that the principal cannot be held liable for
false imprisonment caused by the agent's own malice or
personal motives, 5 nor can the principal be held liable
where the agent has caused the arrest after the crime has
been committed and the only end it can serve is to vindicate
public justice. This is true since the act was not committed
under any authority from the principal, and bears no rela-
" Birmingham News Co. v. Browne, 228 Ala. 395, 153 So. 773 (1934) ;
McCrory Stores v. Satchell, supra, n. 2; Gillis v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 8upra, n. 4; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Dowling, supra, n. 4.
" Bushardt v. United Inv. Co., 121 S. C. 324, 113 S. E. 637 (1922); Ham-
mond v. Eckerd's of Asheville, 220 N. C. 596, 18 S. E. 2d 151 (1942) ; Rigby
v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co., 160 Wisc. 228, 151 N. W. 260 (1915) ; Conover
v. Jaffee, 238 App. Div. 147, 263 N. Y. S. 618 (1932).
1 t Long v. Eagle, 5, 10, and 254 Store Co., 214 N. C. 146, 198 S. E. 573
(1938) ; Moseley v. J. G. McCrory Co., 101 W. Va. 480, 133 S. E. 73 (1926) ;
Hurst v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 107 S. W. 2d 183 (Mo., 1937) ; Newton v.
Rhoads Brothers, 24 S. W. 2d 378 (Tex., 1930) ; Staples v. Schmid, supra,
n. 7; Knowles v. Buliene & Co., 8upra, n. 7; McCrory v. Stachell, supra,
n. 2; J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, supra, n. 7.
U Adams v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 Misc. 27, 257 N. Y. S. 776 (1932);
L. S. Ayres & Co. v. Harmon, 56 Ind. App. 436, 104 N. E. 315 (1914) ; Perkins
Bros. Co. v. Anderson, supra, n. 4. Merely because detectives are hired does
not give rise to an inference that the store owner has given express
authority to arrest suspected thieves, the proper inference being they are
hired to protect his property, with the implied authority attendant there-
with as is necessary or customary to perform his duty.]zCobb v. Simon, 124 Wisc. 467, 102 N. W. 891 (1905).
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tion to the agency purpose of protecting the principal's
property.16 The Court pointed this out in the instant case
by distinguishing it from Nance v. Gall."
Special instructions to agents entrusted with the custody
of the principal's property regarding the arrest of the sus-
pected shoplifter have no effect on the principal's liability,
if again the arrest is within the express or implied authority
of the agent's general scope of employment." Where the
arrest is made by a public officer on the information fur-
nished by a clerk or any agent, the principal can be held
liable if furnishing such information is within the express
or implied authority of the clerk or agent, since there is no
distinction in regard to the master's liability in arresting
or causing an arrest."9 However, when an agent merely
assists a public officer in making an arrest he is under the
direction of the officer rather than his principal and is with-
out the scope of his express or implied authority.2 0
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals affirms its
alignment with the majority rule, eliminating the incon-
sistency which appeared in earlier cases.1
DAvID R. STAMBAUGH
1135 A. L. R. 654-6; Pruitt v. Watson, 103 W. Va. 627, 138 S. E. 331 (1927) ;
B. C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Ennalls, 108 Md. 75, 69 A. 638 (1908) ; 1 RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY (1933) §245; 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed., 1914) §§1974-1976.
17 Nance v. Gall, 187 Md. 656, 50 A. 2d 120, 51 A. 2d 535 (1947). This case
involved the scope of employment of a railroad supervisor who caused the
arrest of the plaintiff for damage which had already been repaired. The
Court felt that the agent's act was to vindicate public justice, rather than
protecting the railroad's property.
8J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S. W. 2d 359 (1935);
Knowles v. Bullene & Co., 71 Mo. App. 341 (1897).
19 Zinkfein v. W. T. Grant Co., 236 Mass. 228, 128 N. R. 24 (1920).
2Geary v. Stevenson, 169 Mass. 23, 47 N. E. 508 (1897) ; Meyer v. Monnig
Dry Goods Co., 189 S. W. 80 (Tex. Civ. App., 1916).
See Norvell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Md. 14, 128 A. 2d 591 (1956)
and Banks v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 212 Md. 31, 128 A. 2d 600 (1956).
These recent cases though primarily concerned with malicious prosecution
(but not of shoplifters) cite the principal case with approval with the result
that the prior inconsistencies in the Maryland case law, arising out of the
rule of the Mali case, have been resolved.
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